Applications in Medicine
To illustrate the effect of natural frequencies, we asked 96 advanced medical students to solve four realistic diagnostic tasks. Each participant worked on two probability and two frequency versions; the order of representation format and which task was in which format was balanced (11). For each of the tasks, more participants correctly inferred the likelihood of having the disease given a positive test when the statistics were communicated as natural frequencies (Fig. 1) .
Other medical practitioners could also profit from representing statistical information in terms of natural frequencies. risks to the client in natural frequencies. Instead, they used probabilities and percentages, and, in the majority of the counseling sessions, the information was either inconsistent or wrong. For instance, one counselor estimated the base rate and the false-positive rate to be around 0.1%, and the sensitivity to be 99.9%, and then stated that the client's probability of infection given a positive test is also 99.9% (applying steps 1 to 4 above to his estimates yields a probability of 50%). In fact, 15 out of the 20 counselors told this low-risk client that it is 99.9% or 100% certain that he has HIV if he tests positive (applying steps 1 to 4 to the numbers found in the literature yields an actual probability of 50%).
Percentages can mislead in other-ways. For example, it may sound impressive to learn that mammography screening can reduce the risk of breast cancer fatality in women by 25% [for 50-to 74-year-old women (14)].-However, this percentage does not say anything about the actual frequencies. If 4 out of 1000 women without symptoms die of breast cancer within the next 10 years (15), the relative risk reduction of 25% means that 1 woman in 1000 women who undergo screening would be saved. A woman without symptoms is most likely not one of the 4 to whom the risk reduction applies, but one of the other 996 instead-and many of these women may suffer as a result from the screening. For instance, false-positives occur and, moreover, cancers that grow so slowly that they present little risk will be diagnosed and unnecessarily treated. As long is as important to the making of legal decisions by judges, attorneys, forensic experts, and jurors as it is to medical decision-makers (16, 17). In considering the admissibility standards for scientific evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically indicated that courts need to consider "known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation" (18).
In a study conducted in Germany, we asked 27 professionals who would soon qualify as judges and 127 advanced law students to evaluate two criminal-court case files involving rape (19) . In both cases, a DNA match was reported between a DNA sample from the defendant and one recovered from the victim. Aside from this evidence, there was little reason to suspect that the defendant was the perpetrator. Expert testimony reported the frequency of the recovered DNA profile as 1 in 1,000,000 and then stated that it was practically certain that the analysis would show a match for a person who indeed had the DNA profile (in other words, sensitivity = 100%). The expert also reported the rates of technical and human mishaps leading to false-positive results in laboratory tests to be about 0.003 (20) .
When these statistics were expressed as probabilities, only 13% of the professionals and under 1% of the law students correctly inferred the probability that the defendant was actually the source of the trace. But when the identical statistics were stated as natural frequencies, 68% and 44% of these same participants made the correct inference (Fig. 2,  left) . The different ways of expressing the same statistical information altered the verdicts in each case. When the information was presented as probabilities, 45% of the professionals and 55% of the students rendered a verdict of guilty, but only 32% and 33% did so when the same statistics were expressed as natural frequencies (Fig. 2, right) . When verdicts hinge on statistical evidence, understanding that evidence is crucial, and pursuing this simple method of fostering statistical insight could contribute to that goal (21, 22) .
Implications for Teaching
The beneficial effects of natural frequencies on statistical reasoning in the studies reported above occurred without training or instruction. Systematic training in the use of natural frequencies can even help people to reason with probabilities. The key is to teach representations rather than rules-that is to teach people how to translate probabilities into natural frequencies, as shown in steps 1 to 4. Traditionally, however, students are instead taught how to plug probabilities into mathematical formulas such as Bayes's rule.
Teaching representations rather than rules-and expressing statistical information in natural frequencies where appropriate-can help to foster the statistical reasoning needed to make sound decisions. Of course, the big developmental gap between the capacities of young children and the performance of adult decisionmakers is typically filled by an education system that teaches children about collec- 
